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Abstract
How does the war on terrorism affect crime? We investigate a natural experiment
first studied by Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), which found that increased police
presence in certain blocks due to a terrorist attack decreases crime. Our examination
suggests that the story may be more complex. First, our findings confirm that increased
police presence appears to reduce crime in those blocks that received 24-hour surveil-
lance due to a terrorist attack (protected blocks). However, increased police surveillance
may also have increased crime in unprotected blocks by (a) shifting police forces away
from or (b) displacing ordinary criminal activity to unprotected blocks. Crime levels
increase substantially in unprotected districts that are located several blocks away from
protected ones. This effect appears to be larger than that of crime deterred, suggesting
that shifting police resources to fight terrorism may in fact increase absolute levels of
ordinary crime.
1 Terrorism, Police, and Crime
Understanding the causal effect of police presence on crime remains a long-standing puzzle in the
economics of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968; Cameron, 1988). Credible answers to the question
of whether police presence deters crime are difficult to obtain because of simultaneity of police
levels and crime (Levitt, 1997; McCrary, 2002; Levitt, 2002; Marvell and Carlisle, 1996; Corman
and Mocan, 2000). To break this simultaneity, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) (“DS”) examined
∗We are grateful to Rafael Di Tella and Ernesto Schargrodsky for making their data available. Research support
was provided by the Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University.
†Leighton Homer Surbeck Professor of Law; Yale Law School, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06520, Email:
j.donohue@Yale.edu
‡Ph.D., Department of Government, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School; Phone 617–642–5904,
Fax: 617-496-2254, Email: daniel.ho@yale.edu, URL: people.iq.harvard.edu/˜dho
1
a natural experiment to isolate the causal effect of police presence on crime. In particular, DS
capitalized on a terrorist attack on the main Jewish center in Buenos Aires in 1994. In response to
this horrendous attack, which killed 85 and wounded 300, the federal government assigned 24-hour
police protection to every Jewish and Muslim institution in the country. Employing a difference-in-
differences (“DID”) approach, DS compared auto thefts in two locales – (1) neighborhood blocks
before and after assignment of 24-hour police protection (“protected blocks”), and (2) blocks that
were not assigned this special protection (“unprotected blocks”). This approach bears substantial
promise since the temporal and geographic distribution of additional police protection can be
assumed to be plausibly exogenous (see also Klick and Tabarrok, 2005). DS found “a large deterrent
effect on observable police crime...[and that] [t]he effect is local, with no appreciable impact outside
the narrow area in which the police deployed” (p. 115).
Here we build on this important work to examine the effects of terrorism and police reallocation
on both protected and unprotected blocks. In particular, we investigate whether there is any
evidence for a “displacement effect” – that is, increased crime in the unprotected blocks that
would bias upward the DS estimates. DS acknowledged that “it is still possible that car thefts
were displaced in a way that we are unable to measure, in which case the effect of policing may
be smaller than our estimates suggest” (p. 117). Using the same time-series approach that DS
used for protected blocks, we find that unprotected blocks that served as a control group in the
DS analysis appear to experience substantial increases in crime after the terrorist attack. This
suggests that the independence assumption of the DID estimator may be violated, since police
reallocation to protected blocks may affect unprotected blocks. Substantively, police forces may
have been shifted away from unprotected areas as a result of the terrorist attack, and/or added
police protection in protected blocks may have displaced crime to unprotected blocks. Providing
24-hour protection to some areas to fight terrorism appears to require some sacrifice in protecting
other areas from ordinary crime. Our evidence suggests that this reallocation of the police force
increased aggregate auto thefts, and that this impact was anything but local.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins our investigation of the displacement hypothe-
sis with three approaches: exploiting time-series and cross-sectional variation, cross-validation with
a pretreatment sample, and examining where crime may have gotten displaced as a result of the
police reallocation. We also provide a nonparametric randomization inference approach (Rosen-
baum, 2002; Ho and Imai, 2004; Imbens and Rosenbaum, 2005) that addresses well-known variance
estimation problems in DID and before-after designs (see also Bertand et al., 2004). These four
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pieces of evidence are largely consistent with the displacement hypothesis. Section 3 concludes.
2 Evidence for the Displacement Hypothesis
2.1 The DID Approach
To identify the causal effect of police presence on car theft, DS employed a DID estimator:




it +Mt + Fi + it, (1)
where T jit = 1 denotes increased police presence which equals 1 if block i = 1, 2, ..., 876 was j block(s)
away from a Jewish or Muslim institution and if the month t = 4, ..., 12 was after July (i.e., t > 7),
Mt represents time fixed-effects and Fi represents block fixed-effects. Two key assumptions to this
estimator are that (a) the control group of unprotected blocks is unaffected by the added police
protection to protected blocks (independence), and (b) that protected and unprotected blocks follow
the same time trend. Figure 1 plots average monthly car thefts per block in the three Buenos Aires
neighborhoods studied by DS from April to December 1994. The top panel presents blocks that
would receive added police protection in August, and the middle panel presents blocks that serve
as the control group. While this figure shows the protected blocks appear to have experienced
declines in car thefts, the middle panel also suggests that crime increases in unprotected blocks
after the terrorist attack. The bottom panel depicts averages over time. Mean car theft levels are
indistinguishable between protected and unprotected blocks before the attack, but after the attack
the mean level for protected blocks decreases while it increases for unprotected blocks.
Under the DID assumption, the overall trend for the control group would present the “natural”
occurrence of car thefts among protected institutions but for the terrorist attack. This could be
implausible if there is block-specific seasonality in crime (which implies there is no natural bench-
mark for crime trends in the protected blocks) or if independence is violated due to police or crime
displacement. This is far from a minor technical concern. Indeed, DS expressly acknowledged the
possibility of displacement (p. 117) and anecdotal evidence suggests that substantial police reallo-
cation occurred. As DS noted, for example, roughly one third of police officers in the neighborhood
of Once had to be reassigned to protection duties (p. 117). That said, DS posited that police
displacement may not be a large issue because reassignment may have been largely from adminis-
trative tasks and from outside of the districts examined. Of course this is a question that should be
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Figure 1: Average Monthly Car Thefts Per Block from April to December of 1994 in Three Buenos
Aires Neighborhoods. In response to a terrorist attack in on July 18, the federal government
provided 24-hour police protection starting in August for Jewish and Muslim institutions, the
blocks of which are depicted in the top panel. The middle panel depicts blocks that received no
additional police protection. The bottom panel depicts mean trends for protected and unprotected
blocks. This figure shows that while there was a downward trend in car thefts prior to the terrorist
attack, car thefts appear to have increased in unprotected blocks in August, indicating that the
DID assumption may be violated by crime or police displacement. Observations are randomly
jittered for visibility. Car thefts occurring between July 18 and July 31 are excluded as in DS –
thefts are therefore normalized to 30-day months.
effect on police levels in control blocks, this reallocation could still have displaced criminal activity
to adjacent blocks. In sum, DS’s natural experiment would be perfect if: (1) police staffing in the
unprotected areas had been unchanged after the terrorist attack as the staffing in the protected
area rose with police of average quality; and (2) crime in the protected and unprotected blocks
was not linked, so that the higher police protection in one block did not simply shift crime to
the unprotected blocks. The danger that displacement of criminals would contaminate the control
group is substantial. While DS conducted an exemplary slew of sensitivity and robustness analyses,




In addition to their DID analysis, DS also presented time-series evidence for blocks close to the
protected institutions that showed a significant drop in car thefts on the protected block after the
police reassignment (DS, Table 3E). In Table 1, we employ a similar time-series approach, but
unlike DS, we apply it only to unprotected blocks. Our time-series estimation confirms the trends
suggested by Figure 1: Column (A) suggests that unprotected blocks experience an increase in
roughly 0.014 car thefts per month, representing a 13 percent increase from before the terrorist
attack.1 Columns (B) and (C) test whether this effect may be driven by spillover effects from
protected blocks, estimating the effect on blocks that are one or two blocks away from Jewish
or Muslim institutions. There is a hint of evidence (albeit not statistically significant) that the
protective halo from the increased police presence extends for one block. Beyond that, the control
for nearby blocks leads to slightly higher estimates of the spillover crime increase in the remaining
unprotected blocks.
If police forces were optimally allocated to fight crime prior to the terrorist attack, we might
expect that reallocation of police forces to protect Jewish and Muslim institutions would have a
net negative effect on ordinary crime. Since only 37 of 876 blocks (roughly 4 percent) contain a
Jewish or Muslim institution, even a small increase in crime in these districts may overwhelm the
estimated auto theft decrease of roughly 0.081 in protected blocks. Column (D) confirms this,
by testing whether aggregate auto theft levels were greater before or after the attack. Across all
districts there was an increase of 0.011 car thefts per month per block after the terrorist attack.
Relying on such simple pre-post comparisons can be problematic. Most importantly, serial
correlation can lead to understated standard errors, which may in turn lead us to falsely attribute
auto theft changes to police reallocation. Such serial correlation, which is well-known to plague
DID estimators (Bertand et al., 2004), may be particularly acute given the seasonality of auto
theft that is typical in the United States (Corman and Mocan, 2000). If auto theft in Argentina
similarly decreases in the winter season, simple time-series estimates may overestimate the deterrent
effect of police while underestimating the displacement effect (recall that the peak of winter in
Argentina occurs roughly in July-August). DS conducted a host of specification tests by primarily
reestimating standard errors under a series of clustering assumptions. To assess sensitivity here,
we employ randomization inference (Fisher, 1935; Rosenbaum, 2002; Ho and Imai, 2004), which
1This is calculated from the baseline average number of car thefts for all blocks more than two blocks away from
a protected institution of 0.108 (i.e., 0.014/0.108 = 0.130).
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Unprotected Blocks Only All Blocks
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Post Terrorist Attack 0.0140∗∗ 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0176∗∗ 0.0110∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0074) (0.0054)
One-Block Police & −0.0174 −0.0176
Post Terrorist Attack (0.0151) (0.0157)
Two-Block Police & 0.0006
Post Terrorist Attack (0.0128)
Block fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month fixed effect No No No No
Number of observations 7551 7551 7551 7884
R2 0.1895 0.1897 0.1897 0.1896
Table 1: Least-Squares Dummy Variables Regression of Average Car Thefts Per Month Per Block
Employing Same Time-Series Approach of DS (p. 123, Column (E)). The positive findings on
Post Terrorist Attack indicate that car thefts increased in unprotected blocks as police forces were
reallocated. One-Block/Two-Block Police & Post Terrorist Attack indicates whether a unit was
one or two blocks away from a protected institution and observed after the terrorist attack. When
no month fixed effects are used, the dependent variable is normalized to a 30-day month as in DS
(p. 124). Columns (A)-(C) exclude 333 protected blocks. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** (***) indicates significance at the 5-percent (1-percent) level.
capitalizes on the assumption that the timing of the terrorist attack is exogenous. Randomization
inference tests the sharp null hypothesis of no in-sample effects by treating time of the terrorist
attack as the only random variable. Using all permutations of the treatment yields an exact
randomization distribution, which asymptotic distributions are designed to approximate under
certain assumptions (Imbens and Rosenbaum, 2005). This has a primary benefit of not relying on
distributional assumptions about the error term, thereby addressing the same types of concerns
raised by Bertand et al. (2004) and Moulton (1990).
As a first cut, for the full sample we activate time dummies at each of the 8 months of the
dataset. This reveals that the coefficient with the highest effect is when July is treated as the
breaking point. Given the low number of months, however, we have little power to reject the null
hypothesis of no impact of terrorism (the lowest p-value, which we obtain here, is 1/8 = 0.125). We
hence conduct the same analysis activating weekly time dummies to compare crime levels before
and after any given week. This yields 36 possible values and thereby higher power (the lowest p-
value would be 1/36 = 0.03). Figure 2 plots all 36 test statistics, which simply represent difference
in mean car theft levels before and after. The solid dots indicate test statistics for unprotected
blocks only. Under the null hypothesis of no effects, the observed test statistic of 0.0024 car thefts
per week is the third highest in the sample (p-value=0.08). For protected blocks, on the other hand,
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Weekly Randomization Inference Results
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Figure 2: Plot of Randomization Distribution of Moving Weekly Time Dummies. The x-axis
depicts at which week a time dummy is activated for a total of 36 weeks, excluding car thefts
occurring between July 18 and July 31. The y-axis depicts the least squares estimate of the
time dummy coefficient. Solid (hollow) dots indicate estimates for unprotected (protected) blocks.
Dots are black to indicate statistical significance if the absolute t-statistic exceeds 2, and grey
otherwise. This figure shows that using time-series randomization inference we find that the police
reallocation due to the terrorist attack increased crime in unprotected blocks (p-value=0.08), but
had a negligible impact on protected blocks (p-value=0.22).
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effects (p-value=0.22). Using the full sample, the p-
value for the observed test statistic of an increase of 0.0016 car thefts per week is 0.08, suggesting
a positive overall effect of the terrorist attack on car theft. This exercise reveals an important
virtue of randomization inference compared to conventional estimators, akin to that discussed by
Bertand et al. (2004): for protected blocks, we would estimate a significant effect for over 41% of
the permutations at a 0.05 level, even if we have randomly selected the activation of time dummies.
These apparent false positives are indicated by the black (versus grey) dots in Figure 2, 15 of which
are significant for the protected blocks depicted on the lower part of the graph.
Randomization inference can also incorporate the additional exogeneity assumption regarding
the distribution of blocks to which additional police protection was assigned, thereby gaining
larger power depending on the test statistic. Specifically, assuming that a terrorist attack could
have targeted some institution such that police protection would have been provided to any other
combination of 37 other blocks, we have a total of 8 × (87637 ) possible permutations. Since this
number exceeds 2.0 × 1066, we approximate this distribution with Monte Carlo sampling. (Of















































Figure 3: Randomization Inference for Exogenous Indicator Variables of Presence of Bank, Public
Building, and Gas Station in Block. This figure shows that assuming random timing of the terrorist
attack and random targeting of a subset of 37 of 876 blocks yields no detectable difference between
protected and unprotected blocks. Randomization distribution is approximated with 10,000 Monte
Carlo simulations.
structures, could truly select from a population of targets that yields such a high number of blocks.
If the assumption is not met, a researcher may need to redefine the potential target population,
which may decrease the power of the test.) Testing the effects of a time dummy interacted with a
dummy on protected and unprotected districts yields p-values of 0.005 and 0.000 for a decrease of
0.07 and an increase of 0.02, respectively, with 10,000 simulations. The former is consistent with
the overall deterrence findings of DS, while the latter suggests an additional dimension consistent
with the displacement hypothesis.2
To compare the effects, Figure 3 presents the randomization distribution for exogenous covari-
ates of the presence of a bank, public building, or gas station on a block. For each of these the
observed statistic is well within the mid-range of the simulated randomization distribution, mean-
ing that there are no differences along protected and unprotected blocks before and after the actual
terrorist attack.
Our above investigation provides robust evidence for the displacement hypothesis, suggesting
that the DID assumptions are violated. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that the DS story appears
to be correct, in that “a posted and visible police guard” dampens crime locally, but incorrect in
asserting that this effect is “large, negative, [and] local [with] little or no effect outside a narrow
area” (p. 131). Due to the terrorist attack, police forces and crime appear to have been displaced,
thereby leading car thefts to increase in unprotected districts.
2Randomization inference can of course also incorporate the original DID test statistic, yielding a p-value of 0.05.
To obtain fully nonparametric confidence intervals, researchers can additionally invert the test as shown by Imbens
and Rosenbaum (2005) and Ho and Imai (2004).
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(A) (B) (C)
Same-Block Police 0.0080 0.0080 0.0080
(0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0215)




Block fixed effect No No No
Month fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 3504 3504 3504
R2 0.0147 0.0147 0.0147
Table 2: Cross-Section Least Squares Dummy Variable Regressions of Average Car Thefts Per
Month Per Block on All Blocks Before Terrorist Attack. These null results are consistent with
the idea that systematic differences between protected and unprotected blocks do not drive any
findings. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** (***) indicates significance at the 5-percent
(1-percent) level.
2.3 Cross-Validation with Pretreatment Sample
To further validate our hypothesis, we conduct a series of robustness tests with the pretreatment
sample only. First, we investigate whether we can detect cross-sectional differences in protected
and unprotected blocks. Figure 2 presents results estimating effects on same-block police blocks
and blocks that are one or two blocks away from protected blocks. If we can detect systematic
differences in these blocks prior to the terrorist attack, this would call into question the DID
approaches use of these blocks as a control group. Each of the estimates is indistinguishable from 0,
however, suggesting that prior findings are not driven by preexisting differences between protected
and unprotected blocks. This is consistent with the other randomization checks conducted in DS
(p. 131).
Second, Table 3 examines the time dynamics of the pretreatment sample, by activating police
dummies on any of the three months prior to the actual terrorist attack. This is similar in spirit
to the randomization approach presented above, and DS conducted an analogous robustness check
using the DID specification. These results suggest caution with simple time-series approaches.
Both protected and unprotected blocks exhibited sharp declines in car theft rates even prior to the
terrorist attack. Columns (A)-(C) present sharply negative effects for all pretreatment blocks, which
remain at the same level when excluding protected blocks in columns (D)-(F). We cannot reject
the null hypothesis that these downward trends are the same for both protected and unprotected
pretreatment blocks. The bottom panel shows that this is also the case when interacting the
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treatment with protected block dummies, although some of the direct downward trend is soaked
up by the interactions when April 30 serves as the cutoff. This Table provides one justification for
why randomization inference approaches that make no assumptions about the time dynamics may
be preferable to this parametric approach.
2.4 Testing Displacement Effects
If the displacement hypothesis is correct, we should see a clear geographic pattern in crime rates
before and after the terrorist attack. Specifically, we might predict a weakly monotonic increase in
crime levels in blocks adjacent to protected blocks. To verify this, Figure 4 depicts a contour plot
of density of crime levels on the y-axis and distance to Jewish or Muslim institution on the x-axis
(0 indicating a protected block). The left panel depicts the density of car theft levels prior to the
terrorist attack: the contour line of 0.005, for example, indicates that the highest month-block rate
of 0.4 car thefts occurred in blocks that were 1-4 blocks away from a Jewish/Muslim institution.
The right panel depicts the same contour lines for the months after the terrorist attack. This
depicts a substantial shift of crime away from protected blocks. Contour lines all intersected the
left hand axis at higher levels in the left panel. Moreover, each of the contour lines in unprotected
blocks shifts outward, most notably for blocks that are 2-3 blocks away from protected blocks.
Every level of month-block car theft increases substantially. For example, prior to the terrorist
attack roughly 0.026 of all month-blocks recorded a 0.25 average car thefts when 2 blocks away
from protected blocks. That number climbs from 0.026 to 0.044 after the terrorist attack.
To test this more formally, we estimate equations with a dummy variable for post-terrorist
attack and interacted this variable with indicators for how many blocks away from a protected
institution the block was. Figure 5 plots the point estimates in the white line and 95% confidence
intervals, with the estimated impact on car thefts on the y-axis and distance on the x-axis. This
figure depicts the same story of the contour plot: the terrorism attack has a negative impact on
protected blocks, but shifts car thefts upward in virtually all unprotected blocks, most notably
in blocks that are just 2-4 blocks away from protected blocks. This suggests that there may
be a substantial redistributive component to fighting terrorism and police reallocation. While
reallocation has substantial benefits in decreasing ordinary crime for protected blocks, it increases






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Contour Plot of Car Theft Density by Proximity to Protected Block. The density is
estimated by the proportion of car thefts occurring at a particular distance before or after the
terrorist attack. This figure shows that crime levels were substantially higher in protected blocks
(distance equals 0) but that these crimes appear to be displaced to unprotected blocks that are
several blocks away. Unprotected blocks just two or three blocks away from a Jewish or Muslim
institution, for example, experience sharp increases in crime levels denoted by the upward movement
of the contour lines to above 0.4.
3 Conclusion
To summarize what we have learned in our investigation, Table 4 characterizes four potential states
depending on the nature of displacement effects. The columns distinguish whether unprotected
blocks are hermetically sealed; that is, whether added police protection in protected blocks dis-
places crime towards unprotected blocks. The rows distinguish whether the additional protection
constituted a pure increase of police in protected blocks or whether police forces were shifted from
unprotected to protected blocks. DS assumed the conditions of Cell (1) in the upper left: namely,
(a) that no crime is displaced to unprotected blocks, and (b) that the increased police presence
constituted a pure increase in resources. Under these strong conditions, the DID estimates are
unbiased. Cell (2) in the upper right indicates that crime is displaced but that the pure increase
in police presence in protected blocks is not offset by any reduced policing of unprotected blocks.
One would expect some crime shifting, so the DID estimate is biased upward. Cell (3) in the lower
left indicates that blocks are hermetically sealed, but that there is some drop in police presence
or effectiveness in unprotected areas. We would expect that crime would fall in protected blocks
and increase in unprotected blocks. The DID estimate again would overstate the benefit of police.
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The Impact of Police Reallocation To Fight Terrorism













Figure 5: The Marginal Impact of Police Reallocation on Blocks Estimated from a Regression
of Average Car Theft Per Month Per Block on a Dummy Variable for Post-Terrorism and this
Dummy Interacted with Distance Dummies. White line indicates point estimate and grey bands
indicate 90% confidence intervals from simulated posterior distribution. This figure shows that
while police reallocation appears to decrease crime levels in protected blocks, reallocation appears
to increase in unprotected blocks, particularly in blocks that are 2-4 blocks away from Jewish /
Muslim institutions. Since no month fixed effects are used, the dependent variable is normalized
to a 30-day month as in DS (p. 124).
Lastly, Cell (4) indicates that crime is displaced to unprotected blocks and that there is a drop
in police in unprotected blocks. As a result, we again expect that crime would fall in protected
blocks, while increasing in unprotected blocks. The DID estimator will again overstate the benefit
of police.
Our analysis confirms that crime fell where more police were stationed for 24-hours a day, but
that crime increased overall. This is not consistent with efficient criminal conduct under the pure
test in Cell (1) because adding police in some blocks while not reducing them elsewhere should not
cause an increase in crime (even though it might cause some crime spillovers from the protected
blocks). On the other hand, if the number of police did not change, but is only reallocated, it
should not be surprising that the areas that lost police protection would experience crime increases
and those that received greater protection would experience less crime.
Our analysis shows that the implicit DS assumption that Cell (1) characterizes the Buenos
Aires data is incorrect, and that therefore their paper does not succeed in its mission of identifying
“the causal effect of police presence on car thefts” (p. 121). With the existing data, however, we
cannot go much farther in providing a definitive conclusion about which of the other three cells
13
No Crime Displacement Crime Displacement
Pure Police (1) DID unbiased (2) DID biased upward
Increase Expectation: Auto theft decreases in
protected blocks only
Expectation: Auto theft decreases in
protected blocks and increases in un-
protected blocks
Police Shifted (3) DID biased upward (4) DID biased upward
Expectation: Auto theft decreases in
protected blocks and increases in un-
protected blocks
Expectation: Auto theft decreases in
protected blocks and increases in un-
protected blocks
Table 4: The Appropriateness of DID Estimation and Expected Effects on Crime under Four
States.
properly characterizes the evidence in Buenos Aires. Several pieces of information would help to
shed more light on the precise displacement channel. First, was the increased police presence a
pure increase in police or a shifting of police resources? The nature of reassignment would help
to assess whether police presence or effectiveness decreased in control blocks. Second, if police
were in fact shifted, were they drawn from proximate blocks? If police were shifted from across all
districts, our finding of the geographic proximity of crime displacement would suggest that blocks
are not hermetically sealed. Third, where are criminals from and what draws them to a particular
location? Such information, in conjunction with the geographic displacement patterns, may further
enable us to distinguish which of the remaining three states of Table 4 properly characterize the
effect of police on crime.
In sum, our findings suggest that fighting terrorism involves complex tradeoffs in police force
allocation. Added police protection does appear to reduce crime in protected blocks, but it also
appears to increase crime in proximate blocks. Moreover, ordinary levels of crime appear to in-
crease at an aggregate level, suggesting that contrary to DS, the effects are anything but local.
Methodologically, our investigation lends further strengths to recent critiques of DID approaches
(Bertand et al., 2004). Nonetheless, we offer a number of ways in which scholars can at least
partially subject these assumptions to empirical validation.
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